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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF STAI'E OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, a body corporate 
and politic of the State of 
Utah, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
OREM CITY, a municipal corpora-
tion of the State of Utah; 
PAYSON CITY, a municipal cor-
poration of the State of Utah; 
and PLEASANT GROVE CITY, a 
municipal corporation of the 
State of Utah, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Case No. 19,138 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS CITY OF OREM AND PAYSON CITY 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a decision granting the respon-
dent's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Fourth Judicial District Court, Judge Allen B. Sorensen 
presiding, granted Respondent Utah County's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on the issue of whether the appellant 
cities have a duty under Utah law to reimburse the respondent 
for the costs incurred in housing violators of municipal 
ordinances in the county jail. The trial court ruled that 
the cities have a duty to reimburse the Count; on the basis 
1 
oE 3ec. 10-8-58, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended), 
and in reliance upon the case of Grand Forks County v. City 
of Grand Forks, 123 42 (N.D. 1963). 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellants seek to have this Court reverse the 
summary judgment granted below and instruct the trial court 
to enter summary judgment for the appellants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts of this case are as set forth in the statement 
of facts contained in appellants' original brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE RELEVANT UTAH STATUTES DEALING 
WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR COUNTY JAIL 
COSTS, READ AS A WHOLE, INDICATE CLEAR 
LEGISLATIVE INTENT THAT SECTION 10-8-58, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953, AS AMENDED), 
IS NOT TO BE INTERPRETED AS EMPOWERING 
UTAH MUNICIPALITIES TO CONTRACT FOR 
THE USE OF UTAH COUNTY JAILS. 
In the trial court, Judge Sorensen granted the respondent's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, concluding that the "defendant 
cities have a legal duty" to pay the expenses of housing 
prisoners in the Utah County jail when such prisoners are 
confined there for violating appellants' municipal ordinances. 
The only explanation for this conclusion was that it was 
"in accordance with Section 10-8-58, U.C.A. (1953, as amended), 
and the case of Grand Forks County vs. City of Grand Forks, 
2 
12 3 N. W. 2d 4 2. " Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
at 3, Respondent Utah County extrapolates from that conclusion 
the theory that Sec. 10-8-58 "create [s] a municipal ;:iower 
to contract with a county for the use of its Jail;" and, 
consequently, the appellant cities have become liable for 
the jail costs at issue under an implied contract, in that 
they have received services they could have legally contracted 
for. Brief for Respondent at 9-10. Appellants contend, 
for the reasons set forth below, that Sec. 10-8-58 does 
not enable municipalities to contract with counties for 
the use of the county jails and that there is no basis 
for finding an implied contract here, if that is indeed 
the basis for the judgment below. 
The question of which Utah political subdivision is 
to bear the cost of incarcerating prisoners in a county 
jail is clearly addressed in various sections of the Utah 
Code. As stated in appellants' initial brief, sec. 17-22-3 
explicitly requires the county sheriff "to receive all 
persons committed to jail." The statute is mandatory; it 
provides no optional right of refusal. Both Sec. 17-22-8 
and Sec. 17-15-17(3) designate the expense of housing prisoners 
in the county jail as a county expense. The respondent 
itself admits that, at least initially, counties are obligated 
to pay all jail costs, which admission implicitly acknowledges 
that counties cannot unreasonably refuse to accept prisoners 
committed to the county jail. Brief for Respondent at 
S. The respondent county then asserts that the appellant 
cities should be liable for the "ultimate jail costs" because 
other Utah statutes require certain governmental entities 
to reimburse counties for the expenses incurred by counties 
in jailing persons incarcerated for violating state statutes 
or local ordinances. Brief for Respondent at 4-6. However, 
a careful review of these statutes will show that the counties 
are entitled to reimbursement only in a few limited circum-
stances. In addition, the 1983 amendment of Sec. 17-22-8 
by the Utah Legislature indicates that the respondent's 
interpretation is incorrect and that a county's right to 
reimbursement has been expressly limited to a few specified 
circumstances. Section 17-22-8 presently reads: 
The sheriff must receive all persons committed 
to jail by competent authority and see that they 
are provided with necessary food, clothing and 
bedding in the manner prescribed by the board 
of county commissioners. The expense incurred 
in providing the above services to prisoners 
shall be paid out of the county treasury except 
as provided in Sections 17-22-8.5 and 17-22-10. 
The relevant portion of Sec. 17-22-8.5, U.C.A., reads: 
The state shall reimburse any county for the 
actual costs of incarceration for a person convicted 
of any felony and sentenced to serve in a county 
jail as a condition of probation. 
This same requirement was previously found in Sec. 77-18-1, 
U.C.A., before being relocated and made a separate section 
by the same 1983 legislative act which amended Sec. 17-22-8. 
The other stated exception, Sec. 17-22-10, U.C.A., states 
that a sheriff is not required to receive or care for a 
4 
person committed upon process in a civil action or proceeding 
"unless security is given on the part of the party at whose 
instance the process is issued." <\s stc1ted in the appellants' 
initial brief, an accepted rule of statutory construction 
regarding express exceptions to a general statutory rule 
is that the legislature creating such exceptions did not 
intend additional exceptions. Initial Brief for Appellant 
at 6-7. The Utah Supreme Court has previously recognized 
and applied this rule of construction in Broadbent v. Gibson, 
105 Utah 53, 67-68, 140 P.2d 939, 943 (1943). 
Appellants find it noteworthy that both Sec. 10-8-58 
and Sec. 17-22-8.5 (in the prior language of Sec. 77-18-1) 
were in existence when the exceptions to Sec. 17-22-8 were 
amended by the 1983 Utah Legislature; yet, only Sec. 17-22-8.5 
was added to the list of statutory exceptions. Appellants 
find this indicative of a clear legislative intent that 
Sec. 10-8-58 should not be interpreted as requiring cities 
to reimburse counties for the use of county jails, for 
that statute was not included as an exception to the obligation 
of counties to pay the expense of housing all county jail 
prisoners. 
The respondent's interpretation of the relationship 
between Sec. 17-22-8 and 10-8-58 would require this Court 
to make the determination that the Utah Legislature did 
not intend to limit the stated exceptions in Sec. 17-22-8 
to those found in Sections 17-22-8.5 and 17-22-10. However, 
5 
rule of construction given above, the Legislature's 
failure to include "city prisoners" as an exception to 
the requirement of Sec. 17-22-8 indicates an intent that 
counties alone bear the ultimate expense in housing violators 
of appellants' ordinances in the county jail. 
The appellant cities also cited the 1983 amendment 
to Sec. 32-1-24 in their initial brief as another statute 
indicating legislative intent that counties bear the sole 
responsibility for paying jail costs connected with housing 
violators of municipal ordinances in the county jail. 
Initial Brief for Appellants at 4-5. The respondent's 
attempt to explain the special appropriation to counties 
for jail expenses under Sec. 32-1-24, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953, as amended), (Brief for Respondent at 6-7), completely 
fails to meet the appellants' argument. Restating that 
argument here, appellants observe that the $1,087,500.00 
(25% of $4,350,000) designated by sec. 32-1-24(1) to be 
used specifically "for confinement and rehabilitation or 
both, and construction and maintenance of facilities for 
confinement or rehabilitation or both of persons arrested 
for or convicted of alcohol related offenses" is appro-
priated only to Utah counties. It is important to note 
the reference to "alcohol related offenses." This generic 
designation indicates that these funds are available not 
only for the confinement of violators of state DUI and 
intoxication laws, but also for the confinement of violators 
6 
of municipal DUI ordinances. 'i.cc, onlj t11e countie3 rece1-1e 
the funds. It is to 3r J '", ,_ls tc1e respondent 
does, that the State ,:<tended to aid the counties 
in paying the increased costs rncarcerating certain 
offenders, but did not intend to drd the cities who would, 
according to the counties' position, lie required to pay 
such increased costs without financial assistance from 
the beer tax revenues. This is particularly true in light 
of the fact that the cities prosecute a great 
of the DUI offenders in the state. It is much more logical 
to conclude that the Legislature appropriated all of the 
beer tax incarceration money to the counties because they 
are the political entities required to bear these costs 
in Utah. The appellants' position that Sec. 32-1-24 indicates 
a legislative intent that counties in Utah are solely liable 
for jail costs does not, as the respondent fears, "decrease 
funding for those entities . which are legally required 
to shoulder the cost of both construction and maintenance 
of jails and rehabilitation centers, as well as the confinement 
of both county and state alcohol offenders." Brief for 
Respondent at 7. Rather, under the appellants' argument, 
such entities will still receive the total funds appro-
priated to them under Sec. 
belief that the appellants 
32-1-24. ConLrary to respondent's 
are seekin•3 to '1ave these funds 
replace money which respondent .:ippellants owe 
to it, appellants do not seeK to these state funds 
7 
!:'?PL'!Ce an·1t'1ing. One cannot replace something which never 
exi.3ted. The expenses incurred in housing prisoners is 
a cnarge against the county treasury. This appropriation 
should simply be added to the amount already budgeted from 
the general funds of the county, which funds are derived 
from taxes imposed county wide. If the cities were required 
to reimburse the county in addition to counties getting 
this money, the result would be an illogical windfall for 
the counties. 
The mandatory nature of Sec. 17-22-8, coupled with 
the specific absence of any statutory right to reimbursement 
from cities for county jail costs, shed light on the proper 
interpretation of Sec. 10-8-58. Section 10-8-58 is simply 
an enabling statute to allow cities to choose between building 
their own. jails to house violators of city ordinances or 
to use the county jail to house such prisoners. The geograph-
ical distance of a municipality from the county jail, as 
well as the personnel and transportation costs involved, 
may dictate that a city construct its own jail facility 
rather than transport prisoners to and from the county 
jail. Other reasons (including security, lack of manpower, 
etc.) may cause the governing body of a city to provide 
a jail facility for the incarceration of prisoners pursuant 
to commitment orders issued by competent authority. Such 
considerations explain the statutory option provided to 
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was violated. Fines 1:1 c " t r i t s ) t t :1 .o t n l r d 
class ar2 Ll be µal•i to t.,e ?oict1cal 3uudi•1ision 
whose law was violated. Michigan Compiled ;:,aws Annotated sec. 
600.8379 (Supp. 1980-1981). In turn, t:-ie countf is required 
to pay all the expenses of µrisoners convicted for violating 
city ordinances where courts of the first and second class 
have jurisdiction, M.C.L.A. Sec. 801.4a (Supp. 1980-1981), 
while the cities must pay fe>r those exµenses when courts 
of the third class have jurisdiction. Id. at 478 The 
payment of the expense of incarcerating prisoners in a 
county jail is dependent on which entitJ receives the benefit 
of the fines. Statutes regulating payment of fines in 
Utah are not so structured. Prior to the 1983 amendment 
of Sec. 78-4-22, Utah Code .:'\nnotated (1953, as amended), 
one-half of fines and all e>f bail forfeitures resulting 
from violation of Aµpellant City of Orem's ordinances were 
paid to the City. Following t:-ie 1983 amendment e>f this 
statute, the City retains no fines and onl; e>ne-half of 
the bail forfeitures. Thus, t:1e reasoning in City of Grand 
K.apids is unpersuasi·:e Ln Utai1, oeirq dee i·ied .rnder statJtes 
not reflecting t:-ie legis:ative requirements 
in utah. 
•I l ts 1:; l t 1 un. In Sonoma County v. City of Santa Rosa, 
12,), 36 810 (la99J, a city cnarter provision 
re '.]'U i red t hat ·; i o 1 a to r s ,J f s t a t e 1 aw be sen ten c e d to the 
C.:•)Unt; Jail 1nd violators of cit/ ordinances be sentenced 
to the cit; jail. In that particular case, the city recorder 
'ud erroneousl; committed "city prisoners" to the county 
The city was held to be responsible for the payment 
of the expenses incurred in boarding them. There was no 
statute granting the city a permissive use of the county 
Jail, but instead, the decision was based on the city charter 
provision expressly prohibiting the use of the county jail 
to house violators of city ordinances. Section 10-8-58 
3rants Utah municipalities a permissive use of the county 
jails, and hence, the holding of Sonoma County is inapplicable 
in Utah. 
respondent also cites Washington Township Hospital 
District of Alameda County v. County of Alameda, 263 Cal. App. 
2d 272, 69 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1968), as authority for "the 
general rule that cities are liable for the cost of housing 
:tty prisoners in the county jail." Brief for Respondent 
at 3-4. However, the basis for that "general rule" was 
inj1c3ted in Washington Township Hospital District to be 
:3L. Gov't Code Sec. 36903 (West 1968), which read: 
Imprisonment for violation of an ordinance shall 
be in the cit} j3il, unless by ordinance the 
body prescribes imprisonment in the 
countv J3il. If cit} prisoners are imprisoned 
in the county jail the expense is a charge against 
the city. 
Thus, the "general rule" relied on by respondent is only 
applicable in jurisdictions which, like California, have 
a statute expressly making the expense of imprisoning "city 
prisoners" a city charge. Utah is not such a jurisdiction. 
In fact, a California court in a decision rendered subsequent 
to Washington Township, set forth the "general rule" correctly 
when it stated: 
The general rule is that a public corporation 
is liable for prison expenses when, and only 
when, such liability is imposed by statute, and 
that in no case may a public corporation be held 
liable for prison expenses merely by implication. 
City of Pasadena v. Los Angeles County, 118 Cal. App. 2d 
497, 499, 258 P.2d 28, 30 (1953). Thus, the "general rule" 
is contrary to the respondent's position, there being no 
Utah statute imposing liability for prison expenses on 
Utah municipalities. Section 10-8-58 of the Utah Code 
simply enables cities to construct jails or use the county 
j ai 1. It imposes no obligation on Utah cities to pay for 
the cost of incarcerating "city prisoners," and appellant 
is not aware of any other Utah statute which mandates such 
a requirement. 
None of the cases relied on by the respondent were 
decided under a statutory scheme similar to that established 
in Utah. Because the determination of who is to pay the 
cost of incarcerating prisoners is based in statutory law, 
and not on any "general rule," the statutory differences 
15 
noted in the cases above make respondent's cases inapplicable 
in interpreting the Utah statutes. Contrary to respondent's 
allegation that "appellants have failed to cite any authority 
contrary to the general rule that cities are liable for 
tne cost of housing city prisoners in the county jail," 
Brief for Respondent at 4, appellants have cited specific 
statutory authority, i.e. Sections 17-15-17(3) and 17-22-8, 
U.C.A. (1953, as amended), as such authority in Utah. 
Appellant cities have cited no cases in support of their 
position simply because the case law dealing with the issue 
at hand has not been decided under a statutory scheme similar 
to Utah's. 
The key to all of the cases and statutes cited by 
all of the parties in this action is that each state has 
the right to define the duties and obligations of each 
of its political subdivisions. The cities and counties 
in Utah are controlled by state statutes and must follow 
the dictates of these laws. In this case, Utah county 
is attempting to avoid its responsibility under Utah law 
by reliance upon cases from other jurisdictions whose legis-
latures have enacted laws that establish different obligations 
as between cities and counties. The Court should not be 
misled by these decisions but should determine the responsi-
bilities of the parties pursuant to the clear intent of 
the Utah statutes cited above. 
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THE DISTRICT COURT AND THE aESPONDENT 
ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT AN IMPLIED OR 
QUASI CONTRACT EXISTS BETWEEN THE RESPONDENT 
AND APPELLANT, WHICH CONTRACT REQUIRES 
THE APPELLANTS TO REIMBURSE THE RESPONDENT 
FOR USE OF ITS JAIL. 
Not only did the district court err in interpreting 
Sec. 10-8-58 as allowing cities to contract with counties 
for use of county jails, but it also erred if its cryptic 
conclusion is to be read to imply that any type of contract 
dealing with jail costs existed between appellant cities 
and the respondent. 
Because the court below based its conclusion t:-iat 
the appellants are under a legal duty to reimburse the 
respondent on the case of Grand Forks County, it 
is assumed that the district court was proposing that grounds 
existed to find an implied-in-law contract between the 
appellant cities and the respondent. The North Dakota 
supreme Court stated in Grand Forks County: 
Decisions holding a municipality liable on implied 
contract for benefits received are based on the 
theory that a municipal corporation ought not 
to receive benefits which it can legally acquire 
by contract, but for which it has not contracted, 
and then avoid liability for the reasonable value 
of the benefits received on the plea that no 
contract had, in fact, been consumated. 
123 N.W. 2d at 45. The court also noted: 
[W]here a municipality has the power to enter 
into an obligation and is not prohibited from 
creating a liability in any but a specified way, 
it may be held liable on an implied agreement, 
upon the principle of unjust enrichment: for services 
rendered and for goods furnished. 
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Id. at 46. This language is similar to this Court's explanation 
of a "quasi contract" (synonym for implied-in-law contract) 
in Rapp v. Salt Lake City, 527 P.2d 651 (Utah 1974): 
[A quasi contractual obligation] is imposed by 
the law for the purpose of bringing about justice 
without reference to the intention of the parties. 
Such obligations are not true contracts but are 
based on unjust enrichment or restitution ••.. Where 
the facts indicate a duty of the defendant to 
pay, the law imputes to him a promise to fulfill 
that obligation. 
Id. at 654-55. 
Assuming that this implied-in-law or quasi contract 
theory was the basis for the district court granting the 
respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, appellants argue 
here that it was error for the district court to so hold 
for five related reasons: ( 1) Utah cities cannot legally 
acquire by contract the use of county jails, (2) there 
can be no implied-in-law contract where such an agreement 
was not formally approved by the appellants, (3) there 
can be no consideration provided by counties in providing 
prisoners the use of county jails because the counties 
are legally obligated to provide such service, (4) there 
is no consideration by counties because cities receive 
no benefit unique to themselves, and (5) the appellants 
do not, in fact, "use" the county jail. 
The first reason given has been explained in POINT 
I, supra. Summarized briefly, Sec. 10-8-58 only enables 
Utah cities to build their own city-operated jails or to 
use the county jails. Because counties are already obligated 
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S27 P.2d ;it 6S4. :3ot'1 :otate anJ legislation unpose 
certain formalities on appellants here. For example, Appellant 
Cit/ of Orem operates under the "council-manager" form 
of government. Section 10-3-1223, U.C.A., requires 
all contracts of the City to be executed on its behalf 
by its ma:r)[. Section 10-6-138 of the "Uniform Fiscal 
Proceuures for Utah Cities" (Cnapter 6 of Title 10, 
U.C.A.), requires the cit/ recorder to "countersign all 
contracts made on oenalf of the city and maintain 
a properly indexed record of all such contracts." Sections 
and of t'1e Orem Cit::; Code impose parallel formalities 
upon contracts the City. Additionally, Sec. 
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t:ie f111anc1cil policies and administration of cities. 
fh1s Court in Rapo specifically found the plaintiff's claim 
in tnat case co "be directed towards enforcing a 
contractual obligation," 527 P.2d at 654, but still neld 
that plaintiff encounters the statutory requirements 
which mandate his contractual obligation is void without 
fulfillment of the requisite formalities." 527 P.2d at 
655. Thus, the court below in the instant case erred in 
suggesting the existence of a quasi contract where the 
requisite statutory formalities were not observed between 
the respondent and appellants. 
Reason three above is based on the statutory obligation 
of counties to house and pay the jail costs of all prisoners 
committed to the count1 jails. This statutory obligation 
amounts to a pre-existing duty, the presence of which ·;itiates 
any consideration on the part of counties. As this Court 
said in Baggs v. Anderson, 528 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah 1974): 
"[A] n agreement to do that which one is already required 
to do does not constitute consideration for a new promise." 
Se<c> also County of Clark v. Bonage '.-lo. 1, 615 P.2d 939 
i'le•;ada 1980). Absent consideration, neither a quasi nor 
a:v: otner of contr.:ict can be found between the appellants 
anJ the respondent. 
'lot onlJ can no consideration be found to have been 
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given by the County under the pre-existing duty rule, but 
there is no consideration given by the County in the instant 
case because the appellant cities receive no benefits from 
the use of the county jail which are not shared by Utah 
residents in general. The respondent enumerates in POINT 
II of its brief various benefits which it claims are received 
by the appellant cities when "city prisoners" are housed 
in the county jail. Brief for Respondent at 7-10. The 
respondent in turn argues that the alleged receipt of the 
benefits entitles it to compensation from the appellants 
on a quasi contract theory. However, close analysis of 
these benefits indicate that they are not received uniquely 
by the appellants, but are enjoyed by all state residents. 
First, respondent implies that appellants receive 
a benefit from receipt of fine and forfeiture monies assessed 
against city ordinance violators. Brief for Respondent 
at 7-B. As noted at page 12, supra, Appellant City of 
Orem does not receive any money from the payment of fines 
when a prisoner is committed to the county jail. U.C.A. Sec. 
78-4-22 now requires that all fines resulting from convictions 
in circuit courts be remitted to the state. Although it 
is true that the City may receive fifty percent of bail 
forfeitures, any time a prisoner is present before the 
court and is fined and sentenced to jail, the City receives 
nothing. When bail is forfeited, the arrestee is not before 
the court and no jail sentence is imposed; therefore, the 
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of jail costs does not arise. The end result 
is that any time a prisoner is committed to the county 
Jail, he or she will have been taken before a judge; and, 
at that point, the City receives no monetary benefit from 
the imposition of any fine. 
Second, the respondent cites Utah Code Annotated Sec. 
10-8-85 (1953, as amended), as bestowing on cities the 
benefit of using county jail prisoners on city projects. 
Brief for Respondent at 8. In the context given by respondent, 
it would appear that Sec. 10-8-85 is limited to permitting 
cities to use only "city prisoners" on city projects. 
However, the statute permits cities to use person 
committed to the county or municipal jail or other place 
of incarceration" on such projects (emphasis added). 
Cities, then, can command the work of a prisoner convicted 
of committing a criminal act in the unincorporated area 
of a county just as well as commanding the labor of a person 
imprisoned for violating a municipal ordinance. Similarly, 
under the statute a city could exercise the same privilege 
even if no "city prisoners" were in the county jail. Any 
benefit bestowed by Sec. 10-8-85 is available to cities 
whether "city prisoners" are housed by the county or not. 
Therefore, Sec. 10-8-85 benefits are not a function of 
counties housing "city prisoners," but are simply the result 
of cities being entitled to make use of any prisoner in 
the county jail. Appellants also note that Utah Code Annotated 
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Sec. 17-5-31 (1953, as amended), grants counties a similar 
right to have any jail prisoner work on county projects. 
It reads: 
[Counties] may provide for the working of prisoners 
confined in the county jail under convictions 
for misdemeanors . for the benefit of the 
county, upon public grounds, roads, streets, 
alleys, highways or public buildings, when under 
such judgment of conviction or existing laws 
such prisoners are liable to labor. 
Thus, the benefits of prisoner labor are available to both 
counties and cities and is not an exclusive privilege of 
the entity whose law the prisoner happened to violate. 
Third, respondent alleges that appellants receive 
a benefit from having "city prisoners" housed in the county 
jail by being relieved of an obligation which appellants 
are "under a duty" to provide. Brief for Respondent at 
9. Because respondent does not cite the source of such 
a statutory duty, it is assumed that respondent finds such 
an obligation in sec. 10-8-58. However, as noted previously, 
that statute is simply an enabling act permitting cities 
to build city jails or to use county jail facilities for 
incarcerating violators of city ordinances. It is not 
a mandatory statute requiring cities to jail such violators 
in city jails. Appellants, being under no statutory obligation 
to imprison "city prisoners" in city jails, are not relieved 
of any costs by respondent fulfilling the duty and obligation 
imposed upon it by Sec. 17-22-8. 
Although the benefits discussed above are the only 
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ones by the respondent as being received by the 
appellants, appellants note that this Court may find appellants 
are benefited in the use of the county jail by the purposes 
behind incarceration, such as protection, deterrence, rehabili-
tation and punishment. While appellants do not deny the 
receipt of these benefits, as is explained in POINT IV, 
infra, they assert that such benefits are likewise enjoyed 
by county residents as well as Utah residents in general. 
Hence, appellants do not receive any unique benefits not 
conferred upon all state residents by law and, thus, are 
not liable to Utah County on any contract theory. 
Finally, there is no factual basis for finding, nor 
was it ever stipulated, that appellants "use" the county 
jail within the contemplation of Sec. 10-8-58, at least 
for post-conviction detainees. As stated in appellants' 
initial brief, the prisoners sent to the county jail are 
ordered there by a judge of the Eighth Circuit Court. 
Initial Brief for Appellant at 10. The circuit court judges 
are officers of the state, not of the City. The City has 
no control over the prisoner at the time of sentencing 
and does not, therefore, control the use of the jail. 
The county sheriff, in turn, receives the prisoners at 
the county jail, not because the City expressly or impliedly 
asks him to, but because a state judge commits the prisoners 
to him and because he is required by law to receive them. 
The County Commissioners here have never made acceptance 
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of "city prisoners" at the jail contingent upon payment 
by the cities. The sheriff simpl/ accepts the prisoners 
because the law says he must. 
In summation, cities are not enabled to contract w1t.1 
counties for the use of the county jails, the requisite 
statutory formalities required in contracts with public 
entities were not observed, counties have a pre-existing 
duty to pay the expenses of housing prisoners in the count/ 
jail, cities receive no unique benefits to themselves by 
the county providing the jail and paying related housing 
costs, and the appellant cities do not in fact "use" the 
county jail within the contemplation of sec. 10-8-58. 
This being true, it is clear that the district court erred 
in concluding that appellants here are liable to the respondent 
under any quasi contract theory. There is no equitable 
reason to find that cities should pay counties for the 
jail costs involved here. 
POINT IV 
THE INCARCERATION OF CONVICTED VIOLATORS 
OF MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES SERVES A VALID 
STATE PURPOSE FOR WHICH THE STATE MAY 
REQUIRE THE EXPENDITURE OF COUNTY REVENUES, 
WHICH REQUIREMENT DOES NOT CONTRAVENE 
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Respondent and Amicus Utah Association of Counties 
contend that requiring counties to pay the cost of incarcerating 
convicted violators of municipal ordinances no 
county purpose and that such a requirement is, therefore, 
violative of Art. XIII, Sec. 5, of the Utah Constituti•)ri. 
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,iri·•f L>t R•e>spondent at 11-13, Brief for Amicus Association 
)f 3t However, Utah case law indicates that 
r:u, ,:irot 0 ct1·)n of the public through law enforcement and 
incarceration of convicted criminals is a valid public 
purpose for which the state can require the expenditure 
Jf county funds; and therefore, neither Sections 17-15-17(3) 
and 17-22-8 of the Utah Code nor appellants' position offend 
the Utah Constitution. 
As stated by Amicus Utah Association of Counties, 
provisions like Art. XIII, sec. 5, permit local taxation 
to advance statewide purposes. Brief for Amicus Association 
of Counties at 6. Thus, the State Legislature may require 
local governmental entities to pay the costs of providing 
a delegated state function. Such was the holding in Salt 
Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 42 Utah 548, 134 P. 560 
(1913). The issue in that case was the constitutionality 
of Chapter 144 of the Laws of Utah 1907, as amended [now 
codified as Utah Code Annotated sections 55-11-1 to -8 
(1353, as amended)]. The Chapter required cities and counties 
to jointly provide for juvenile detention homes. Although 
such acts were found to be state functions, the requirements 
)f Chapter 144 were found not to contravene any constitutional 
provisions because cities and counties are agents of the 
state, and the state was held to have the power to assign 
functions to its agents for the good of the public. 
rhe Court explained: 
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The state government, in the discharge of its 
functions, may, however, classifj the counties 
and cities of the state, and may for the purpose 
of augmenting the public good and welfare, treat 
both counties and cities as state agencies, and 
may even impose additional duties upon the residents 
and taxpayers, and especially so when the latter 
have a special as well as a general interest 
in the thing the state is seeking to effectuate 
for the public good. 
Id. at 554, 134 P. at 563. The Court also stated: 
What is required from Salt Lake City is required 
from it as an arm or agency of the state government. 
Salt Lake City as a corporate body is 
in no way interested in the moral welfare of 
the delinquent children provided for in the juvenile 
court law of this state, but the people who live 
within the city of Salt Lake as well as those 
who reside elsewhere within the state are interested, 
and by reason of that fact the people of the 
state, through their government, may act in such 
matters and call upon both counties and cities 
as state agencies to assist the state in its 
effort to protect and enhance the educational 
and moral welfare of delinquent children under 
a certain age. 
Id. at 554-55, 134 P. at 563. Thus, the Court not only 
found that the state may delegate the obligation of performing 
a state function to its political subdivisions, but also 
explicitly noted that such delegation does not alter the 
function's identity as a state concern. Similarly, in 
Denver and Rio Grand R.R. Co. v. Grand County, 51 Utah 294, 
170 P. 74 (1917), this Court observed that requiring counties 
to provide funds to certain mothers with dependent children 
did not change the identity of that function to a strictly 
local one. The Court there concluded: "We are not prepared 
to hold that the [Dependent Mothers' Act], in effect, does 
not define and declare a policy of the state, nor that 
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it is not wit:1in the province of the Legislature to so 
define and declare a state policy.• Id. at 301, 170 P. at 
76. 
Respondent claims that Salt Lake County actually supports 
its position by pointing out that the Legislature could 
not interfere with activities which are a function of city 
government. Brief for Respondent at 11. Appell an ts are 
not arguing that the Legislature is indeed interfering 
with either city or county government functions by requiring 
respondent to pay the jail costs involved here. Instead, 
they assert that the incarceration of prisoners, including 
those convicted of violating municipal criminal ordinances, 
is a statewide, public concern, in support of which the 
state can require the counties to expend funds. 
The case of Salt Lake City v. International Associ-
ation of Firefighters, 563 P.2d 786 (Utah 1977), also supports 
appellants' position that law enforcement is a state purpose. 
Police and fire protection are essential to the 
administration of state government, which has 
the duty to protect and defend the rights of 
its citizens to life, liberty, and property. 
The duty of the state cannot be circumscribed 
by city limits, particularly where uniform state 
action may be required. Police, fire, and health 
protection are matters of statewide concern. 
The exercise of the police power is an attribute 
of state sovereignty, a portion of which it may 
delegate, but not relinquish to municipalities, 
which have none of the elements of sovereignty. 
Since fire protection is a state affair, the 
legislature may withdraw its delegation of power 
to municipalities to determine the wages, hours, 
and other conditions of employment of fire fighters, 
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and such action does not constitute 
ference with a municipal function. 
added.) 
an inter-
iEmphasis 
Id. at 789. If tne Legislature «eep t:1e power itself 
to determine the wages, hours, and other conditions of 
local firefighters, and if police protection is also a 
state function, then certainly the state can assign the 
function of incarceration of prisoners to the county; and 
the requirement that the support of prisoners therein be 
a county charge does not run afoul of of Art. XIII, Sec. 
5, of the Utah Constitution. 
The fact that a city arrests and convicts a criminal 
offender under a municipal ordinance should not alter the 
fact that the city is fulfilling a state purpose in doing 
so. This is especially true in light of the fact that 
Appellant City of Orem's criminal and traffic code simply 
consists of a verbatim adoption of the state criminal and 
traffic code (U.C.A. Title 76 and Chapter 6 of Title 41, 
respectively and Sections 16-1, -8, -8.l, and -8.2, Orem 
City Code). These provisions of the state code reflect 
the Utah Legislature's determination of acts or omissions 
which constitute crimes throughout the state of Utah and 
for which imprisonment may be used to deter such conduct, 
to protect state residents from those guilty of such offenses, 
and to punish and rehabilitate the offenders. Imprisonment 
of these offenders, whet!ler under the state coue or the 
city code, benefits all state residents by either preventing 
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s'1c'1 conduct or by removing those guilty of the same from 
'.Jtah society. The city's adoption of these state purposes 
does not magicallJ cause the state's concern in these matters 
to disappear. 
Furtner evidence that imprisonment of municipal code 
violators serves a state purpose is seen in the following 
example. Center Street in Orem is one of several state 
highways running through Orem city limits. Utah Code Annotated 
Sec. 27-12-42.1(4) (1953, as amended). When a Utah Highway 
Patrol officer arrests a driver for DUI on Center Street, 
the driver is charged under state law for a class B misdemeanor 
[Utah Code Annotated Sec. 41-6-44 (1953, as amended)]. 
The driver would be prosecuted by Utah County and any resulting 
incarceration of the driver would be a County expense. 
r: an Orem city police officer makes the same arrest on 
the same street under the city code provision adopting 
Sec. 41-6-44, the same state purposes the Utah State Legislature 
desires to achieve in imprisoning the Highway Patrol arrestee 
are accomplished and fulfilled in imprisoning the city 
police arrestee. The state purpose is achieved regardless 
of the identity of the arresting agency or the statutory 
basis for the arrest. The imprisonment fulfills a state-
designated purpose (i.e., the further prevention or punishment 
of DUI conduct), and U.C.A. Sec. 17-22-8 designates the 
County as the state entity responsible for providing and 
funding such state functions. The absurdity of respondent's 
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argument that incarceration of "city prisoners" at count/ 
expense fulfills no state purpose is shown father by the 
ease with which cities could circumvent jail costs under 
respondent's position. Cities could simply fail to adopt 
portions of the state criminal or traffic code which result 
in "city prisoners" being incarcerated. Cities are not 
required to regulate such conduct by state law, but are 
authorized to do so on a permissive basis. See Utah Code 
Annotated, Sections 10-8-47 to -51 (1953, as amended). 
The state criminal and traffic code would continue to prohibit 
the conduct the city no longer regulated. City police 
officers would still be required by state law to enforce 
these state criminal laws. Utah Code Annotated sections 
10-3-913 to -915 and -919 (1953, as amended). When arrests 
were made by city police officers for violations of state 
laws amounting to class B or C misdemeanors, it would fall 
on the county attorneys to prosecute the violators as required 
by Utah Code Annotated Sec. 17-18-1(1) and (2) (1953, 
as amended) . The prisoners would then be "county pr is oner s" 
and the counties would, by the respondent's own arguments, 
be required to pay for their incarceration in the county 
jail. 
Thus, it is clear that the statutory requirement in 
Title 17 that counties pay all expenses associated with 
housing prisoners in the county jail does not contravene 
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sec. 5 o E Art. XI I I because such a requirement is a valid 
public and county purpose. 
Respondent Utah County also contends that Sections 
and 3 of Art. XIII are impinged if counties are required 
to house "city prisoners." These sections require the 
state to establish a uniform and equal property tax rate. 
The respondent believes that because residents in the unincor-
porated area of the county are required to pay a special 
law enforcement tax under Sec. 17-29-3 "over and above 
the taxes collected for general county purposes," use of 
<Jeneral county funds "to pay for part of city law enforcement 
by housing city prisoners" results in unincorporated area 
residents being "doubly taxed." Brief for Respondent at 
13. From this assumption, the respondent apparently concludes 
that the uniform and equal property tax rate requirements 
of Sections 2 and 3 of Art. XIII are being violated. The 
error of the respondent's analysis is seen in the following 
points. First, the State of Utah has not itself imposed 
any nonuniform or unequal tax rate or scheme. Instead, 
it has required by the relevant statutes of Title 17 that 
counties are to provide a county jail, are to receive all 
prisoners committed thereto by competent authority, and 
dre to pay the expense of housing such prisoners, unless 
entitled to a statutory right of reimbursement. There 
does not need to be any "double taxation" of anyone in 
order to support the county jail. If there is double taxation, 
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it is imposed as a matter of the County's choice and not 
by the appellants nor by appellants' interpretation of 
Sections 17-15-17(3) and 17-22-8 of the Utah Code. The 
County could easily impose a uniform county wide tax for 
the housing of inmates in the county jail. Citizens of 
appellant cities would bear the burden equally with all 
other County residents. Any violation of Sections 2 and 
3 of Art. XIII stems from the County's improper taxation 
of the unincorporated county areas and not from state law. 
Secondly, Sec. 17-29-3 of the County Service Area 
Act, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended), does not set 
up a "double taxation" with respect to the incarceration 
of inmates at the county jail. That provision states, 
in part, as follows: "Whenever an unincorporated area 
in a county requires one or more of the following extended 
services which are not provided on a county-wide basis: 
extended police protection such services may be supplied 
by a county service area." (Emphasis added.) The County 
Service Area Act provides solely for services which are 
not provided county wide. The Act cannot refer, then, 
to the county jail, which is a service provided county 
wide, and the taxes imposed under the Act cannot be applied 
towards incarceration of prisoners in the county jail. 
The extended police protection referred to in Sec. 17-29-3 
can only refer to extended patrol and protection by the 
county sheriff and his deputies, who in those unincorporated 
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areas are the chief law enforcement officers assigned to 
patrol and respond to emergency calls. This point similarly 
an3wers Amicus Utah Association of Counties' contention 
that Sec. 17-36-9 (2) (a) requires costs for "incarcerating 
violators of county ordinances [to] be budgeted separately" 
from general county funds. Brief for Amicus Association 
of Counties at 10. That statute merely enables certain 
counties to establish a "Municipal Services Fund" and a 
"Municipal Capital Projects Fund" from which municipal 
services and municipal capital projects are to be appropriated. 
Again, if the County is using this statute to impose any 
additional taxes on special county service districts, the 
responsibility for any resulting "double taxation" lies 
with the County. Appellants do note that nothing in the 
record supports either the respondents' or Amicus Utah 
Association of Counties' assertion that the unincorporated 
county areas are being separately taxed for jail costs. 
Thirdly, respondent's and Amicus Utah Association 
of Counties' argument herein would actually result in "double 
taxation" upon city residents. such residents are taxed 
as county residents for county services provided to them, 
including the provision of a jail as required by Title 
17. Respondent and the Utah Association of Counties would 
have city residents also pay a separate fee for costs 
incurred in housing "city prisoners" in the county jail, 
and cities would be paying twice for the same service. 
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Thus, the arguments put forth Dy t:1e a;:ipellant..3 Jo 
not result in any violation of Art. XIII of the Utah Consti-
tution, but indeed, such constitutional provisions require 
the conclusion that the court below erred in finding cities 
liable for costs of housing "city prisoners" in the county 
jail. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellants have attempted to show that the aut.'1or ity 
cited by the district court below in granting the respondents's 
i"1otion for Summary Judgment does not support that conclusion. 
Contrary to both the conclusion of the court below and 
the respondent's position, Sec. 10-8-58, read to9etner 
with the other Utah statutes dealing with the responsibility 
for county jail costs, does not empower or require Utah 
municipalities to contract with Utah counties for use of 
the county jails. Rather, sec. 17-22-8 requires the counties 
to bear the cost associated in housing prisoners in the 
county jails, including prisoners incarcerated for violating 
municipal ordinances. Utah counties cannot legitimately 
condition incarceration of some prisoners in county jails 
on reimbursment from the cities for jail costs. 
Similarly, the court below and the respondent in its 
brief erred in finding the basis for any contract be'tween 
the appellant cities and the County. First, Utah cities 
are not enabled to enter into any such contract. second, 
contracts with cities are void where, as here, the 
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st3tutory contract formalities were not observed. Third, 
respondent cannot be said to furnish any consideration 
t,,r this alleged contract when it is under a pre-existing 
statutory duty to pay county jail costs. Fourth, the respondent 
,Joes not provide any benefits unique to the appellants, 
and thus, no grounds exist for finding consideration from 
t :1 e county . Fifth, the appellants do not "use" the county 
Jail in that it is state judicial officers that are committing 
"city prisoners" to the county jail. These numerous points 
clearly indicate that no legal grounds exist to find any 
contract between the parties relative to jail cost liability. 
Finally, the arguments put forth by the appellants 
in their initial brief do not contravene any provision 
of the Utah Constitution. Rather, the Legislature's requirement 
that counties provide a jail for county wide use and pay 
associated expenses from taxes collected county wide serves 
a valid public purpose and also produces the most equitable 
approach for providing jail facilities for state, county 
and city misdemeanants. 
Appellants respectfully request this Court to reverse 
the court below and to grant appellants' Motion for Summary 
J t. 
Mc uen 
City Attorney 
Dave McMullin 
Payson City Attorney 
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D E L I V E R Y C E R T I F I C A T E 
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellants City of Orem 
and Payson City to: Neall T. Wootton, Utah County Attorney, 
51 south University Avenue, Provo, Utah 84601; and Ray 
Harding, Jr., Pleasant Grove City Attorney, 35 South Main, 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84604. 
Delivered this day of April, 1984. 
37 
,, 
!vl-0_1.,-
